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Introduction 
On June 28 and 29, 2007, more than 40 government officials, military officers, scholars, and 
security experts from ten countries gathered in Paris at a French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
conference site to discuss potential over-the-horizon proliferation challenges in key countries, as 
well as policy measures to counter those threats.  
The conference built on themes explored at Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016, a conference 
held in Monterey in June 2006 with the goal of examining the conditions that most likely will 
influence national motivations and capabilities for acquiring nuclear weapons proliferation in the 
2016 timeframe.[1] Over-the-Horizon Threats: WMD Proliferation 2020 gathered proliferation 
experts to examine factors that might lead twelve countries toward or away from the decision to 
obtain chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles by the year 2020. Papers 
were also presented on chemical and biological weapons, missiles, the international 
nonproliferation regime, dissuasion, intelligence and interdiction, and the role of security 
guarantees.  
The conference was organized by the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) in conjunction with 
the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was 
sponsored by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts 
Office (DTRA-ASCO). A follow-on conference is scheduled for September 2007 in Singapore.  
Some of the most significant findings were:  
• None of the country-specific presenters predicted that their country would make the 
decision to develop WMD by 2020.  
• In each case, a combination of factors would have to occur in order to move a country 
toward WMD acquisition. Those factors included an external threat, the collapse of the 
nonproliferation regime, and the rise of pro-WMD proponents (or mythmakers), which 
frequently arise with a regime change in the country.  
• For every country examined external security threats were judged to be the most 
important driver of proliferation. More specifically, the presence or rise of an acute 
security threat in the neighborhood was viewed as the most common driver, whereas the 
continued (or increased) effectiveness of the global nonproliferation regime and 
continued confidence in external security guarantees (from the United States and other 
sources) would continue to premise their defense policy around conventional weapons.  
• Projected growth in worldwide nuclear power industry might create new opportunities for 
WMD proliferation, especially if the nonproliferation regime loses effectiveness.  
• Chemical and biological warfare programs are much easier to hide and much cheaper to 
start than nuclear programs. Technical knowledge and intentions are more important than 
capability in the modern world, with many countries possessing the ability to develop CW 
or BW programs very quickly should there be a government decision to do so.  
The conference organizer from the CCC welcomed the presenters and attendees, and noted that 
while current proliferation threats understandably are met with significant concern, over-the-
horizon threats receive much less attention. He explained the theory of WMD mythmakers and 
myths within each country, arguing that within a given country the debate over whether to begin 
WMD acquisition is often driven by a few key individuals, deemed mythmakers, and that following, 
understanding, and influencing the opinions of those key individuals can determine a country’s 
WMD intentions. He observed that the pre-conference concept paper and authors’ guidelines 
tasked each of the country-specific presenters to identify the people who drive the debates on 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles within each country and how they are driving their 
ideas. In addition, each presenter was asked to examine the possible external motivations and 
the economic feasibility and technological capabilities of each state to develop WMD. Finally, 
each presenter was asked to think critically on ways to counter the mythmakers’ arguments in 
order to encourage states from refraining from developing WMD. 
 
Lewis Dunn, Katsuhisa Furukawa, and Robin Walker  
The sponsor from DTRA-ASCO, described his organization’s mission as the U.S. government’s 
in-house strategic thinking office charged with thinking long and deep on proliferation. He asked 
each presenter to think about ways to shape the future proliferation environment, not just respond 
to it, and stressed his desire to take back something practical from the conference to the 
concerned governments. Another participant encouraged the group to look at how the existing 
nonproliferation tools and treaties can work better, either in the existing forms or through 
modification to achieve the goal we all seek: lack of proliferation of WMD. 
Keynote Address  
The conference featured a keynote address by a representative from the Center for Analysis and 
Forecasting (Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision) at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who 
noted that on some of the different scales of time 2020 could be just around the corner. On the 
national timeframe of the countries discussed at this conference, the leaders could change 
several times, whereas when discussing military development thirteen years is nothing. Likewise 
we are unable to predict when major events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th will happen, and major events in the next thirteen years may 
drastically change our view of the proliferation environment. We need to develop and maintain a 
global picture of proliferation, since proliferation challenges encompass many other factors, 
including terrorism and other transnational threats. The world community has been unable to 
unite around commonly held nonproliferation values, obtain a new balance with former partners, 
or develop a major international strategic partnership on proliferation. He identified the two major 
forces currently at work as increased globalization on one hand with a return of geopolitics, 
including the primacy of balance-of-power and zero-sum perspectives on regional rivalries. The 
parameters of political, military, economic, and “soft” power have been brought into question, as 
has the legitimacy of the multilateral system based on the Security Council. The rules of the game 
and categories of international relations are changing as internal and external affairs intermingle 
and some non-state actors become almost as powerful as small states.  
The speaker identified two ways to interpret the current WMD proliferation situation: (1) an 
optimistic view arguing that past predictions of increased proliferation have proven wrong, past 
proliferation has been mostly contained, and looking at the success of the nonproliferation treaty 
(NPT) and (2) the pessimistic view that proliferators are winning and the nonproliferation regime 
is about to collapse in the face of challenges such as North Korea, Iran, and the AQ Khan 
network, which he deemed the “Ikea of proliferation.” In response to a question from one of the 
participants he identified the five most important proliferation challenges as (1) the North Korean 
and Iranian nuclear programs, (2) the weaknesses of the multilateral systems, including on 
missile proliferation and verification, (3) the legitimacy of the system combined with the 
perception of discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear states, (4) the spread of science 
and technology in the globalized economy, including the spread of nuclear power for economic 
and environmental reasons, and (5) the effectiveness of counter-proliferation strategies against 
new networks. To meet these challenges the speaker mentioned the need to reassure non-
nuclear weapons countries that they will have access to nuclear power technology, as well as the 
need for real counterproliferation actions, perhaps using the outline in the European Union’s 2003 
security framework. A key challenge for the future is to foster collective security at the global and 
regional levels and better cooperation within the P5 countries over energy assistance. He 
stressed that proliferation and disarmament cannot be considered separately. In conclusion he 
mentioned the need for the international to develop a lucid view of proliferation, and stated that 
the present situation is not a nonproliferation crossroads or a turning point, since the world is 
constantly at a crossroads when dealing with WMD.  
During the discussion session, one participant asked the keynote speaker where disarmament fits 
into an integrated strategy. Another wondered whether the world really is moving toward a 
balance-of-power situation, noting that the last time the international world was marked by 
balance-of-power competition (the Cold War), proliferation challenges were handled well. One 
distinguishing (and worrying) characteristic of the new balance-of-power systems is significantly 
reduced alliance-block stability, which creates a situation the world may not be able to handle, 
since it has never dealt with a similar situation before. A final question also addressed balance-of-
power issues, noting their rise in East Asia, and asking how the French approach to China 
reflects broad strategic goals.  
The speaker answered that the presence of fragmented actors in a balance-of-power world is 
troubling, and stated that multipolarity seems to be a bad word to the United States. However, in 
his view multilateral solutions are only a part of the game. He noted the challenge and importance 
of making China into a responsible stakeholder. He identified two faces China currently presents 
to the world: its traditional non-interventionist stance and its somewhat different thinking about 
Iran, perhaps indicating a move in the direction of intervention to achieve stability. He concluded 
by discussing the need to keep the arguments for nonproliferation and disarmament separate, 
since combining them may fuel the ambitions of potential proliferators. 
 
Bruno Tertrais, Pierre Levy, Peter Lavoy, David Hamon, and Kerry Kartchner 
Panel One: South Africa and Ukraine  
A French academic chaired the first panel and opened by stating that we need to speak about the 
price of defeat on WMD because we have not been able to get enough action on nonproliferation 
from politicians. He mentioned that the unifying factor between South Africa and Ukraine is that 
both used to have nuclear weapons, renounced them, but remain potential nuclear weapons 
states for the future. 
The presenter on the South African case study stated that South Africa’s government has played 
an international leadership role in nonproliferation, having signed and ratified most international 
treaties on the subject and actively pursued multilateral nonproliferation, with almost all of these 
actions coming since the change of government in 1994.  
He noted China’s increasing interest and influence in South Africa, having invested $900 million 
in 2004 with trade having quadrupled in the past few years to $55 billion. One major reason for 
China’s interest was its need to secure uranium resources. China’s increasing influence, and 
desire for allies, could serve as one factor that eventually might drive South Africa toward nuclear 
rearmament.  
South Africa is fast approaching an end to the surplus of electrical energy it can generate, and is 
increasingly relying on its nuclear energy program. As a country at the forefront of nuclear energy 
development South Africa is both in a position to export its nuclear energy expertise and 
supportive of other states seeking nuclear energy technology, including Iran. Many leaders in 
South Africa believe that support of terrorist groups should not preclude civilian nuclear energy 
use.  
A third possible contributing factor for re-nuclearization could come from frustration over lack of 
progress in the global nonproliferation regime. South Africa is committed not just to 
nonproliferation, but also disarmament, and the speaker suggested that unless real progress is 
made on both fronts South Africa might, ironically, renew nuclear progress as a bargaining tool.  
South Africa has a nuclear weapons legacy, the scientific, industrial, and technological 
infrastructure for reversion, and the resources to re-arm if it so chose. However, South Africa’s 
transition to a constitutional democracy has instilled a strong sentiment against nuclear weapons, 
although the institutional memory is beginning to be lost, and the constitutional framework would 
have to change before it could re-arm. While some factors, specifically external security threats, 
may pressure South Africa towards developing WMD, the presenter argued that the chances of 
such an action were slim in the foreseeable future.  
A French academic presented on the Ukraine, noting that it relinquished the Soviet weapons 
based in the country in 1994, but has not totally disarmed because, although it does not have 
facilities to produce weapons it still has highly enriched uranium reserves, including 13 reactors 
and 4 plants and have not been deprived of any nuclear technology. The Ukraine also retains the 
capability to produce inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Soviet-era plants that still do 
some work on Russian missiles. The government wants to demonstrate its technological prowess, 
strength and capacity, and to that end has plans to double nuclear energy production capability 
by 2030—including up to eleven new reactors—as well as plans to develop new tactical missiles. 
Although the Ukraine maintains the capability to produce ICBMs the government frequently states 
it has no intention of producing them for its own use.  
Since 1994 the issue of whether to rearm has periodically reappeared in the domestic debate, the 
last time after the recent North Korean nuclear test. Due to the perception of serious security 
threats the political will on this issue has never been very strong, and the government is 
constantly weighing political cost of going nuclear. In the 1990s thought it would be too costly to 
the Ukrainian economy to maintain the weapons. Additionally, the political cost, both domestically 
and internationally, of maintaining the weapons would be too high.  
The speaker identified some major barriers that prevent the Ukraine from developing WMD. The 
Ukraine does not and has never possessed the technology to control the whole fuel cycle. 
Currently the government is not willing to assume the cost of going against the international norm. 
She questioned whether the Ukraine ever truly been an aspiring nuclear power or whether it just 
wanted more reward for giving up nuclear weapons initially.  
She concluded that the prospect of the Ukraine developing WMD is unlikely at the moment, but 
conceivable in a “perfect storm” worst-case scenario in the future. The likely conditions would 
include a more threatening Russia, increasing isolation from the world community, and a 
significant weakening of the nonproliferation regime. In order to ensure that the Ukraine does not 
develop nuclear aspirations she encouraged the major players in the global community to engage 
in active security discussions with Ukrainian leaders.  
Source of proliferation: One topic raised during the discussion session was whether these two 
countries could present a risk as a source of proliferation, rather than (or in addition to) being the 
end user? The response regarding South Africa was that material slipping out is a concern, but 
that it is not unique in facing corruption issues. South Africa wants help countering corruption and 
securing uranium mines, and may become frustrated if international progress is slow.  
Ukraine’s disarmament: Another commenter noted that in 1994 Ukraine never had launch codes 
to the weapons stationed within its borders, and asked if those weapons ever served as a 
credible deterrent, and thus wondered whether the Ukraine truly regretted disarming. The 
presenter responded that some Ukrainian government officials do regret giving up the weapons 
so easily without getting more for them, and noted that the Ukraine would need financial 
incentives to ensure that they comply with future deals.  
Utility of nuclear weapons: An American academic asked whether nuclear weapons will become 
epiphenomenal, and almost irrelevant to international security. He argued that nuclear weapons 
are useful add-ons for great powers, but will not help a country become a great power. They are 
useful if a country feels threatened by a great power, so for Pakistan they may be necessary 
whereas for India they are at best useful. If so this raises two issues: (1) if South Africa gets 
nuclear weapons, should the world care? Would it affect the international security environment? 
And (2) The current Iraq war has given preventive war a bad name, but is it a necessary act for 
great powers? Would it be a necessary act for Russia if Ukraine developed nuclear weapons?  
Successful disarmament: One participant presenter noted that South Korea views the Ukraine as 
a successful case of disarmament for both donors of aid encouraging disarmament and recipients, 
and is trying to achieve a similar outcome to the DPRK crisis. Another presenter noted that the 
Ukraine does not have a very good record of following through on nonproliferation efforts, but that 
the Ukraine’s entry into NATO has created a much better framework for discussing these issues. 
The Ukraine might agree with anything and not follow through, but would be more motivated if 
provided with a financial incentive.  
Motivations for re-armament: An American governmental official asked about more specific 
motivations for South Africa to re-arm. Another official asked about the degree to which it was an 
actual decision in the Ukraine to disarm, since maintaining weapons was not really an option, 
which makes it hard to draw lessons from these cases. Additionally, South Africa is trading on the 
“moral credit” of having disarmed, but he questioned the real reasons for disarmament. Was it a 
realpolitik assessment, or did the white apartheid government simply not want the black 
successor regime to not have nuclear weapons?  
 Isabelle Facon, Guillaume Schlumberger, and Noel Stott 
Panel Two: Turkey  
An American academic, who is looking at latent technological capabilities around the world, 
chaired the second panel. He noted that Turkey is an interesting case as a potential WMD 
aspirant because of Iran, the fragmented balance of power system, the continuing drama around 
entry into the European Union, and the internal dynamic on the role of Islam in politics. Could 
these factors lead Turkey to become an isolated country that turns to nuclear weapons in order to 
gain security or respect? 
The presenter on the Turkish case argued that the international environment, not Islam, is the 
most important factor impacting Turkey’s decision to develop WMD, and that while Turkey may 
consider nuclear weapons in the long term, the decision is unlikely in the near future. Most 
scholars anticipate that Turkey will go nuclear, because it sees itself (and is seen from the outside) 
as having a seriously deteriorating security situation, which is made bad not just because of the 
Iranian nuclear crisis. The Iran case is only a one factor that brings out Turkey’s increasing 
isolation, characterized by Turkey’s view that its spot in the European Union is under threat. She 
stated that Turkey does not have mythmakers arguing for nuclear weapons, because no debate 
on the subject is even allowed in Turkey. As long as Turkey is a NATO member and an ally of the 
United States, it does not even want to give the impression of not taking the alliance seriously; 
nothing else matters as long as the alliance is firm.  
Despite the pending entrance in to the European Union, the current Iraq situation reinforces the 
need to establish/reinforce regional relationships. Relations with Syria have never been better; 
the two countries see eye to eye on Iraq, terrorism, and other issues. Turkey feels like it is being 
isolated from the United States, but in the meantime is pulling closer to Iran and Syria. Turkey 
does not want to openly oppose Iranian ambitions, but all decisions fall back on the quality of 
U.S.-Turkish relations, which will determine how Turkey will see the nuclear option. So at this 
point nuclear weapons are not an option, but they could be considered as a last resort if the 
relationship deteriorates.  
Western capitalists, like the current Turkish government, give too much credit to the current 
economic success, but the economy is still vulnerable and could not spare resources to that kind 
of endeavor. Likewise, the technical capabilities do not currently exist. A handful of programs do 
focus on nuclear physics, but they do not have the corresponding industrial infrastructure.  
For Turkey, 2020 is not tomorrow, but the day after tomorrow. Turkey is in need of energy, and a 
strong debate exists on how to get energy. The Turkish government has lost credibility because 
of poor energy planning. Changes in the international system are forcing Turkey to review its 
isolationist stance, but isolation cannot be remedied by obtaining nuclear weapons.  
Discussion regarding Turkey included whether these two crises affected the view of the collective 
security guarantee, and what the implications were for other regimes regarding the importance of 
alliance structure. It has long been a free good, as we look forward the existing regime needs to 
be fed and watered. One attendee wondered whether one could take South Africa or Turkey as a 
pilot case for nuclear energy without providing enrichment and reprocessing technology, since the 
international community needs to avoid the Starbucks approach, with a reprocessing facility on 
every corner. A final discussion surrounded whether Turkey perceives itself as having a national 
security crisis, and where threats will come from once they no longer have NATO or the EU to fall 
back on. 
Panel Three: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Coast Countries  
Another presenter stated that Saudi Arabia and Egypt are two of the most important countries to 
consider as WMD aspirants, particularly as Iran moves towards nuclear weapons. The overall 
trend is of Middle East states moving away from renunciation of nuclear policy and towards a 
more ambiguous hedging posture. Over the last twelve to sixteen months a wave of proliferation 
of nuclear technology has spilled before our eyes. The danger in this is that once a country gets 
an infrastructure in place is in a far better position to become a latent nuclear power that can get 
weapons quickly it they want them. Many of these states recently took the first steps toward a 
WMD program, including Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan. Although the prevailing wisdom in 
the United States is that we should not be concerned with nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia, if the 
United States has the ambition of controlling proliferation it cannot afford not to take it seriously. 
Contractors do a lot of Saudi security work, so WMD work could potentially be similarly 
outsourced to Russians, or other experts.  
Saudi Arabia has to be considered in context of all of these states considering their postures. The 
realist framework argues that each state is continuously searching for power and security, and for 
the propensity of states like Saudi to outsource strategic aspects of security to the United States 
with little domestic political consequences. However, the United States’ political influence and 
military power is declining, so regional states are less confident of it after Iraq. Militias present 
direct challenges to the state system and tribal organization of these countries, and Iran’s 
successful defiance of the United States may lead Middle Eastern countries to seek new sources 
of security. Oil producers especially are in the process of building new political and economic 
relationships separate from the United States. The populations in many Middle Eastern countries 
are very anti-U.S. and –Israeli, and often fail to see the difference between the two.  
All of this does not indicate a certainty of seeking or achieving a fully weaponized capability. 
Scholars or policymakers would be hard-pressed to think of more rational decision-makers than 
the Saudis, so they are unlikely to go the full step of weaponizing, but they may develop partial 
programs just in case. It would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility that the Saudis would hire 
Russians to set up reactors if they thought it necessary. 
The discussion noted how unpredictable the region is due to the war in Iraq. If the Saudis or 
another Middle Eastern country did manage to obtain nuclear technology it might be difficult or 
impossible to recover. The Saudi regime is currently very stable and the house of Saud is well 
entrenched, but the next generation of leaders after Abdullah and Sultan might be less inclined to 
maintain a close alliance with the United States. Another presenter asked whether the United 
States can prevent proliferation while completely supporting Israel. A final commenter stated that 
a balance of power situation in the Middle East creates a security dilemma, with everyone 
becoming more insecure if it accelerates. The presenter noted that the Saudi interest in nuclear 
weapons and balance of power situation could be a blip, with the region returning to the status 
quo in the next ten years or so. He also pointed out that Saudi Arabia has lived under an Israeli 
nuclear threat for decades, so the continued support from the United States is not really an issue. 
 
James Russell, Kerry Kartchner, and James Wirtz 
Panel Four: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela  
An American academic presented the case for possible proliferation by Argentina, Brazil, or 
Venezuela, pointing out that all have been considered potential nuclear proliferators for many 
years, but that in the 1990s that risk declined. At present, Brazil and Argentina have a high 
capability but a low incentive to develop nuclear weapons, whereas Venezuela has a low 
capability but a high potential incentive.  
She briefly described the history of the nuclear programs in each country, but focusing on Brazil 
and Argentina. In the 1950s under Peron and Vargas both were inward looking regimes that 
rejected free trade and pursued nuclear capability including development of centrifuges. In both 
cases the leaders were interested in nuclear technology partly to maintain power, demonstrating 
that domestic politics often have an international reference. In the 1960s and 1970s the focus 
was on retaining inward-looking nationalism and deepening fuel cycle capabilities. The 1980s 
was characterized by a focus on economic heterodoxy, and a transition to democracy, but both 
countries retained a level of nuclear ambiguity. This trend reversed in the 1990s when both 
countries explicitly decided to denuclearize.  
The post-2000 situation in Brazil and Argentina has been characterized as hybrid approaches, 
with each government renouncing nuclear programs, but maintaining some capability. While 
Argentina’s Kirchner has kept military at arm’s length, it has not signed the additional protocol, 
and Brazil resisted the annual inspection of its facilities in 2004.  
In Venezuela President Chavez is trying to follow the populist movement of Peron, and the 
country’s oil windfall has allowed him to make strategic decisions. He wants to ensure that 
Venezuela can be independent of the West, and aligned himself with Iraq (before the United 
States attack) under the guise of needing protection from an invasion or attack by the United 
States.  
Despite the rise of Brazil over the past decade, Argentina has not felt threatened and made the 
decision to attempt to match Brazil in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In fact, although bilateral 
tensions are high, the alliance between the two countries stands out. However, continued 
corruption could push these hybrid coalitions over the nuclear threshold, resulting in some very 
interesting over-the-horizon possibilities.  
Discussion topics included the fledgling Brazilian space program, specifically whether Brazil could 
use its space program to gain respect in lieu of a nuclear program, and whether that would that 
be a nonproliferation issue. One participant challenged all the presenters to be bolder in their 
predictions and identify what factors would make Brazil or Argentina reconsider. One commenter 
argued that it was not democratization but the country transitioning to look outward that brought 
about the reversal of nuclear policy in these countries, and he wondered what tools could 
encourage a country to look outward. 
 
Etel Solingen and Neil Joeck  
Panel Five: Asian Proliferation Roundtable  
Japan 
The Japanese presenter said that Japan first began considering nuclear weapons as an option in 
the 1960s, and that, to this day, external factors remain the main driver of Japan’s perspective on 
the nuclear option. While the culture in Japan is generally characterized by disgust of nuclear 
weapons, policymakers’ thinking is more shaped by realism and the desire to avoid positioning 
Japan as a second-class country. As long as U.S. security guarantee is credible, Japan is unlikely 
to develop nuclear weapons, but the issue has been considered strongly at least five times: when 
China first tested nuclear weapons, during the Vietnam War, when U.S. President Nixon visited 
China, during the North Korean crisis in the 1990s, and following the 2006 North Korean missile 
test. The consistent characteristics of each situation include the Strategic and technical 
implications when the strategic environment shifts, but in each case the risks outweighed the 
value added, and the consideration was almost always reported to the United States, and 
resulted in a strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance.  
Technologically speaking Japan has not perfected the technology that could be applicable for 
controlling warhead of operational missiles and would probably take three to five years to produce 
a prototype small nuclear warhead with an investment of around $2 billion. However, if it was 
deemed necessary Japan could probably produce a crude but effective nuclear device within a 
year. Japan lacks a large amount of fissile Uranium-238 and Plutonium-239, but could probably 
revise the core of a light water reactor. Their most practical method would probably be to create 
an explosive lens, a task within their existing technological capability, but they have not taken any 
steps in that direction. Additionally Japan’s nuclear human resources are declining since nuclear 
energy is regarded as a losing industry and a trend of pacifism among the Japanese scientific 
and academic community.  
The presenter argued that the real value of a nuclear weapon for Japan is in possibly sending a 
warning sign to China, but it’s a pundits’ debate that holds little water among policymakers in 
Japan. The conditions under which Japan might consider the nuclear option include the collapse 
of the international arms control regime; a perceived increase of threats; a reduction of U.S. 
extended deterrence; combined with a change of belief on the part of the government. One key 
factor that could decrease the unlikely even of a re-armed Japan would be increased knowledge 
about U.S. extended deterrence policy, strategy, direction, and capability. 
South Korea 
The presenter on the Republic of Korea stated that South Korea first began a program in the 
wake of the Guam Doctrine (U.S. President Nixon’s decision to withdraw a division from the 
Korean Peninsula). He listed five important determinants of South Korea’s armament situation: (1) 
North Korean nuclear weapons lead to a temptation to develop their own weapons. 
Conservatives in South Korea are critical of what they view as U.S. President George W. Bush’s 
appeasement of North Korea, while leftists are pleased with President Bush’s actions but are 
generally inclined to be anti-United States. (2) The U.S. nuclear umbrella and overall security 
commitment, and especially the point and method when the United States will automatically 
intervene on the Peninsula. In order to be reassured, South Korea needs a firm verbal 
commitment from each new U.S. leader. (3) Japan’s atomic energy industry, and especially what 
Japan does with its spent fuel, could serve as threatening signs for South Korea. (4) The regional 
security environment and sense of insecurity due to their unhappy history with Japan and China 
(he noted that Korea has been invaded by China over 900 times in their history). (5) The level of 
external dependence by the South Korean economy is perhaps the biggest nonproliferation driver, 
since South Korea does over $640 billion worth of trade per year and is the world’s sixth largest 
oil consumer and fifth largest oil importer. He argued that as long as South Korea remains under 
a capitalist government and dependent on foreign trade it would be impossible for the country to 
develop nuclear weapons.  
He concluded that no matter how strong South Korea’s nuclear power capability is, it faces 
overwhelming restraining factors that will prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. However, if 
multiple factors combine the options increase, nuclear weapons could be considered over-the-
horizon. South Korea does not have mythmakers regarding the use of military power, but they do 
have powerful economic mythmakers who will trump the desire to develop nuclear weapons. 
 
Taewoo Kim, Bernard Sitt, and Tanya Ogilvie-White 
Southeast Asia 
Another presenter discussed the nuclear potential of Southeast Asian countries, focusing 
specifically on Vietnam. In discussing why Southeast Asia should be considered an area of 
potential WMD proliferation, she mentioned the Bangkok Treaty, the major economic 
development going on in the region, and the advanced security systems, organizations, and 
counterterrorism operations as possible enabling factors for nuclear breakout. While little public 
debate exists on the issue, Indonesia, despite considerable public opposition, plans to develop a 
nuclear energy program by 2017, while Thailand has expressed a desire for its own nuclear 
energy program by 2020. Countries in the region are driven by energy the need for energy, rather 
than the need to hedge against threats. Vietnam and Indonesia are committed to boosting 
domestic confidence in the direction they are going and are moving forward with nuclear energy 
programs with assistance from advanced nuclear states. They have signed agreements not to 
use the technology for weapons, but have expressed some resistance to export controls.  
The good news for the region is that it is a positive environment. The bad news is that nuclear 
mythmaking does exist in Southeast Asia, driven in part by frustration over a discriminatory 
nonproliferation regime and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 imposing increased 
sanctions on Iran.  
The presenter discussed three scenarios for future WMD proliferation, but thought only one was 
plausible: a copycat response after a nuclear cascade in the region. If the international 
nonproliferation regime fails, one or more countries could hedge and develop nuclear weapons. 
She mentioned the need to look at Australia’s actions because potential Australian proliferation 
would have a large impact on the region.  
In order to reduce this possibility and make the nonproliferation regime more influential the 
presenter argued that Australia should take the lead in proposing a new IAEA framework, to be 
more transparent and build confidence among other non-nuclear weapons states. 
Burma 
The presenter on the Burmese case began by stating that Burma is a special situation because it 
is a closed society, with the discussion and governmental process very opaque, so it is difficult to 
identify either nuclear myths or mythmakers. Despite this, Burma occupies a strategic position 
between nuclear powers India and China and thus should be studied.  
Because of the Burmese government’s appalling record by government people tend to believe 
the worst about its intentions. Added to this is the fact that in April Burma renewed relations with 
North Korea, raising the possibility that North Korea could potentially hide some of its nuclear 
weapons in Burma in order to escape detection, although the presenter dismissed that idea. 
Additionally, on May 15, 2007 the regime announced that it had reached a new agreement with 
Russia to build a new nuclear reactor.  
The Burmese regime is fairly paranoid and thinks it may face an invasion from the United States, 
largely due to its strategic position. The presenter argued that the world should pay some 
attention to Burma, but not create the problem we want to avoid by lending credence to their 
paranoia. He concluded that the world may be creating myths about Burma rather than nuclear 
myths coming from within Burma itself. 
Japanese missile defense: Discussion topics with the Asian panel included Japan’s interest in 
missile defense and how that links up with Japan’s interest in an offensive capability. The major 
issue is how fast such a missile defense could be deployed. Japan views it as a tool for alliance 
management, but currently lacks technical capabilities for missile defense, such as GPS targeting.  
Proliferation for attention: Another question was asked about efforts to use proliferation to get 
attention in the future, something North Korea has done for years. Are there any conditions under 
which North Korea really would give up nuclear weapons? North Koreans believe that change will 
result in their own death, so they are unlikely to ever truly abandon their program. Efforts to 
encourage them to do so would need a combination of carrots and sticks.  
Realism and nuclear myths: Realism says countries will go nuclear when faced with an acute 
threat, but the reality is more complicated than that, with nuclear myths playing a major role. In 
Burma it is a case of subjective versus objective reality, so understanding myths is even more 
important in a paranoid society like Burma. No matter how frustrated they are with the situation, 
no country will pursue nuclear weapons just because they are dissatisfied with the 
nonproliferation regime. 
Panel Six: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Missile Proliferation  
Chemical and Biological Weapons  
An American presenter discussed the challenges of determining whether a country is likely to 
develop chemical or biological weapons (CW or BW), since both programs are largely composed 
of dual-use items. He stated that the important issue is not what materials actors have, but on 
what they know and how they may chose to use technical knowledge. Some areas of science are 
advancing even faster than Moore’s law governing computer speed, and the speed at which 
science is applied is advancing too. This accelerating rate of change combines with surprise to 
generate unexpected results from unexpected places, such as India. It is becoming harder to 
define what constitutes a chemical or biological weapon because the spectrum of options is 
increasing. Nature provides new possibilities for use as weapons, including emerging diseases 
and the manipulation of old diseases. Additionally old diseases can be recovered and potentially 
weaponized, as a team researching the 1918 Spanish Influenza discovered.  
Life sciences is now a global enterprise and applied knowledge is the source of power and 
influence. There is a global competition for patents, the best students, the newest breakthrough 
and more. Reality is now more complicated than simply identifying countries with and without a 
CW or BW capability, since quite a few “innovative developing countries” have to be considered 
potential CW or BW proliferants.  
Security implications include a more complex relationship between capabilities and intentions. 
Proliferation is shaped by perceptions of utility. Threats between states and terrorists may be 
most likely to use BW/CW, including the chlorine bombs now in use by insurgents in Iraq. 
Chemical or Biological weapons could be considered an option as an interim hedge for countries 
in an increasingly dangerous environment. An example of this is the Syrian decision to counter 
the nuclear capability of Israel with chemical weapons. But chemical and biological proliferation 
involves a much wider range of potential actors, including non-governmental threats. The saying 
that “we need networked responses to fight networked threats” is a mere slogan, and in order to 
counter CW and BW threats we need to operationalize it. 
 
Michael Elleman, Michael Moodie, and Andrew Selth 
Missiles  
An American presenter discussed the proliferation of missile technology. He started by 
mentioning the difference between unguided, short-range rockets and guided, longer-range 
missiles. Missiles can be either ballistic or cruise missiles, with accuracy being much more 
important for the ballistic missiles, which are also unsuited for carrying chemical or biological 
agents.  
Missiles can be propelled by either solid fuel or liquid fuel. Advances in a country’s solid fuel 
missiles tend to go in steady increments while they progress on liquid fuel programs in quantum 
leaps, but he stressed that no country is currently developing its own liquid fuel for missiles and 
no major technological breakthroughs have occurred lately. The only major breakthrough has 
been in guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) with the introduction of GPS guidance, which 
can only increase accuracy by 20-30 percent.  
In examining specific missile proliferation the presenter looked at fourteen countries in six 
categories. Those with long-term, sustained programs included Israel, and India, and could 
produce an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) in ten-to-fifteen years if they chose. The 
second category had programs at one time, but got rid of them, and includes Brazil, Argentina, 
and South Africa. The third group is of states that have the technology, but have not produced 
missiles, including South Korea and Taiwan. The fourth group has unsuccessful programs but 
wants missiles, and includes Egypt, Libya, Syria, and many others. Additionally a second tier 
missile proliferation network exists that tries to reverse engineer missiles. Those countries include 
North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran. They produced exact copies of the Scud in 1994. Since North 
Korea is the key state in this network, if the world wants to stop missile proliferation it needs to 
stop North Korea. 
Future missile technological developments: Discussion topics included technologies in 
development now that might change how we think about missiles, which have very little strategic 
use and are mainly of psychological utility at the moment. Would new missile or warhead 
technology change that? Would cruise missile or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology? 
The response was that the most significant breakthrough was the success of the Trident II missile 
system with 119 successful tests in a row, which is remarkable. Some miniaturization, including 
small ICBMs, is possible. In the next 10 years countries will probably move towards cruise 
missiles and possibly UAVs with the goal of making their systems smaller and more dispersible.  
CW/BW Taboo?: Since no state has used BW or CW in a long time, has it developed a taboo with 
a resulting political cost? If the United States strikes against North Koreas nuclear and CW 
programs, what would China do? One attendee argued that a CW or BW attack could be 
outsourced to a non-state actor fairly easily, and the delivery could even be done fairly openly, 
using aerosol delivery systems for example. The knowledge issue is key, regarding export control, 
not just materials. 
Panel Seven: The Nonproliferation Regime and Policy Tools  
The Nonproliferation Regime  
An American discussed how to leverage the types of proliferation shocks we are going to see in 
order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. He stated that many kinds of proliferation shocks 
exist, and that some provide potential momentum for change or opportunity to move to the middle 
or stimulate policy innovation. Proliferation shocks provide an opportunity for cooperation among 
the great powers, because the shock concentrates the mind. He stated that his accompanying 
paper describes eight potential types of shocks, and proposed bi-annual meetings of the 
secretaries of state and defense from each of the P5 countries in order to buttress habits of 
cooperation. 
Dissuasion, Intelligence, and Interdiction  
A British presenter wrote about dissuasion and interdiction with extensive focus on what can be 
learned from the successful actions that convinced Libya to give up its WMD program. He argued 
for a broad definition of dissuasion including all elements of national power that could persuade a 
country not to develop WMD. He discussed three questions to consider: (1) How did the broader 
political, security and economic context influence Libya’s decision to renounce its weapons 
programs? (2) How did intelligence and interdiction specifically contribute to the campaign by the 
United States and United Kingdom to dissuade Libya from developing WMD? (3) What are the 
central lessons from the Libya case for dissuading current and future “states of proliferation 
concern?” He identified some contradictory signs that indicated that perhaps the Qadhafi regime 
politically wanted to give up its weapons program, but the technical aspects of the program had 
enough momentum that they continued. He concluded that the risks of interdiction will always 
have a potential for proliferation backlash. 
Nonproliferation Treaty Regime  
An American government official discussed the degree to which other participants are able to 
deter other proliferation threats. He noted that the world is helping to set clear and powerful 
nonproliferation norms. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) itself is strong, clear, and 
powerful in the preamble, but the text of Article 6 is written in a non-specific way intended to 
encourage good faith negotiations. The treaty says little about fuel restrictions. The treaty has 
resulted in mixed successes, especially regarding Iran. Verification of Article 2 compliance has 
been a particular challenge for the NPT regime. The presenter argued that the most likely threat 
is escalation of a WMD program in response to a threat from a non-nuclear state. 
Panel Eight: Security Guarantees  
International Security Guarantees  
A French academic and policymaker stated that the challenge is to take broadest possible 
definition of security assurances. He argued that positive security assurances and guarantees 
have been a crucial and effective nonproliferation tool. Security guarantees have resulted in 
Japan remaining a non-nuclear weapons state. The NATO guarantee has extended beyond 
NATO to include countries like Sweden. Negative assurances also have a lengthy history. A 
strong tradition exists of non-nuclear use or threats against non-nuclear countries as well as a 
tradition of non-deployment on foreign soil (with NATO being the exception). North Korea is 
currently seeking negative security assurances from the United States in exchange for 
disarmament, but country specific negative security assurances have problems. He wondered 
why the P5 countries will not say that nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence. He also 
mentioned the classic dilemma of deterrence as well as the potential downsides or ethical 
concerns with too strong a security commitment, and pointed out that some countries may not 
want to be protected by outside security guarantees. 
U.S. Security Guarantees  
An American presenter asked whether deterrence threats make the problem worse and whether 
they could be self-fulfilling prophecies. He discussed two different kinds of threats, traditional 
state threats where positive security assurances may be effective and non-traditional threats, 
including non-state actors, where emphasis should be placed less on deterrence and more on 
prevention, possibly including negative assurances. He asked what it would take to deter Iran, 
either from developing nuclear weapons or once it had them. He called for a sustained dialogue 
with friends and allies, arguing that extended deterrence works because of building up credibility 
even more than capability. If deterrence fails we have to build a different kind of security 
community to deal with the new problems. One of the biggest problems the world now faces is 
how to deny terrorists their objectives and prevent them from attacking. He argued that security 
assurances involving counter-terrorism should focus on transparency and confidence building. 
A U.S. policymaker asked six questions for the group to think about and discuss:  
• To what extent is the U.S. nuclear arsenal relevant to security assurances? Is it our 
nuclear arsenal, or our willingness to use our conventional forces?  
• Is there a decline in the confidence of our extended deterrence guarantees? What factors 
affect the strength of it? It is strange that U.S. Secretary of State Rice would go to Japan 
and explicitly state our security guarantee, since in the past we have not done so.  
• Are great powers competing to offer security guarantees?  
• To what extent do missile defenses have a role in guarantees?  
• There is no such thing as a “legally binding security guarantee,” only politically binding 
guarantees.  
• U.S. policy does not permit negative security guarantees, but was the idea of negative 
security guarantees crucial to passing the NPT?  
Another audience member identified a contradictory debate on the issue in Japan, with concerns 
being expressed that decreasing U.S. ICBM forces may not be good for Japan. He asked to what 
extent conventional military forces could replace the U.S. military’s role. Another presenter 
wondered about the possibility of positive security assurances for South Korea and negative 
security assurances to North Korea.  
A U.S. academic wondered what pluses and minuses for are deployments outside of national 
territory and whether those external deployments reassure the recipient country. The presenter 
noted that we have to be careful of our public rhetoric because we sometimes give the wrong 
impression on deterrence versus disarmament. He stated that we want to scare some people, but 
not all the people. 
Conclusion  
In the concluding discussion a U.S. policymaker noted that none of the country-specific 
presenters predicted that their country would decide to develop WMD by 2020, which is a very 
different perspective than the U.S. intelligence community would be likely to predict.  
Another audience member asked if someone had made proliferation predictions 25 years ago, 
how close would it have been to reality. Another attendee noted that former Secretary of Defense 
McNamara did commission such a study, which has now been declassified. However, each 
similar study was a self-denying prophecy, because the policymakers woke up and did something 
about the potential proliferators.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
Notes 
1. See conference report at: 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.pdf and 
the special issue of the Non-Proliferation Review at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133toc.htm. 
 
